A Deposit Insurance System for Armenia
One of the widely cited reasons for the collapse of the USSR is the absence of market incentives. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the breakup of the former Soviet Union the post soviet countries were faced with a difficult transition from an economic system based on central planning to a market-oriented one. This process of transition can be long and arduous because the at the most fundamental level market economies require the presence of system of enforceable private property rights, which are an anathema in centrally planned socialist societies. Therefore, the success of market-oriented reforms is conditioned upon fundamental legislative reforms, including well-defined constitutional rules establishing property rights. Moreover, these reforms must include a legal infrastructure within which private contracts can be written and enforced.
The Republic of Armenia (Armenia) was founded on September 21, 1991; following the breakup of the USSR. Since that time, Armenia has struggled with making the transition to a more market-oriented economy. It has had some success putting in place needed legislative reforms (especially in legal environment), but unfortunately, there is considerable work left to do. This is especially true in the establishment of the regulatory infrastructure to support and promote the development of Armenia's financial sector.
An important early step of reform in transition economies is the development of market-oriented financial institutions. Financial market development is the key to providing cheap and reliable funding for small business and agriculture, critical to a developing nation's growth. In addition, financial institutions provide an alternative to currency and other non-interest-bearing assets for individuals to hold their savings. A stable financial sector should provide benefits to the economy by increasing the level of savings and lower the cost of investing in productive activities.
Economic reforms in Armenia were mainly aimed at the following problems; the solution of some of them is still underway:
• Liberalization of prices and salaries;
• Establishment and development of the institution of private property, privatization of state enterprises and state property;
• Liberalization of foreign trade;
• Establishment of financial institutions and financial management bodies (Central Bank, Securities Commission);
• Establishment of the new system of state finance management;
• Attraction and promotion of direct foreign investment, etc.
A positive factor in future growth of the Armenian economy is its high ranking in economic freedom. The Republic of Armenia is ranked in the 'mostly free' category by To date, growth has been encumbered by the inability of Armenia to attract foreign capital (see Figure 2 ). Many factors have made Armenia an unattractive place for foreign firms to invest, including: the small size of the Armenian market, the poor investment climate, and isolation from the neighboring markets. The poor investment climate stems from internal problems that both impede the development of financial markets in Armenia and in turn hinder the attraction and promotion of foreign investment, mainly:
corruption and bureaucracy; inefficient tax and customs administration; failure to implement agreements to provide an efficient legal framework, resolution of economic disputes and bankruptcy processes (especially in the banking sector).
As in most emerging economies the establishment of a politically independent central bank is an important part of the financial system infrastructure. In Armenia, the central bank is responsible for monetary policy, providing liquidity support for the financial system, and regulating financial institutions. 2 Typical for a transition economy, the banking system makes up nearly the entire financial system and hence, a well-functioning banking sector is critical to economic development.
We take as given that the Republic of Armenia is committed to the establishment of an independent deposit insurance agency to provide a minimum level of deposit guarantees -a level consistent with protecting the savings of small depositors -to enhance the stability of the primary channel for credit in Armenia. Moreover, the Republic of Armenia may need to establish some form of deposit insurance system as part of the conditions for aid from international bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank. Recent literature (Kane [2000] , Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane [2002] , and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache [2000] ) on the adoption of deposit insurance systems outside the United States points to the importance of tailoring the deposit insurance scheme to fit the cultural and legal traditions, as well as the institutional structure, of the Republic of Armenia. Therefore, a careful analysis of Armenia's legal and economic structure must be done prior to the design of the deposit insurance system.
2 The Armenian Law on "The Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia" was adopted in March 27 1993.
The Armenian Economy
The Armenian economy has faced a difficult transition to a market-oriented economy.
During the Soviet regime, the former republics were strongly connected to each other.
The Soviet economy operated like of a central-planning trade zone where production of goods was allocated across republics. Flows of inter-republic trade reflected the initial allocation decision. The collapse of the centrally planned allocation system disrupted trade between the former republics and the lost trade, markets, and/or methods of resolving inter-republic affairs caused a dramatic decline in economic activity in these countries. Over 1990-2001, annual growth in GDP for Armenia was about -0.70% 3 .
However, as Armenia has instituted market-oriented reforms the Armenian economy has sped up. Over the past three years Armenia's real GDP increased 6% in 2000, 9.6% in 2001 and 12.9% in 2002. Per capita GDP, as Figure 1 shows, has also been growing during the three years.
Declines in real activity following the collapse of the USSR were broad-based. Many sectors of the Armenian operated below 1990 levels even a decade later (see table 1 ).
Still, agriculture recovered in the late 1990s and its output materially exceeds 1990 levels.
Agriculture plays a crucial role in Armenian economy as over a quarter of the Republic of Armenia's GDP (25.5 percent in 2002) is produced by this sector. The share of agricultural product in the GDP during 1994-2002 can be see in Figure 9 and the structure of gross agricultural output of RA is presented in Armenia has low labor costs. Moreover, the Republic of Armenia has very few barriers to trade and foreign investment. 4 Low labor costs and a stable legal framework for exporting goods has failed to promote a rapid expansion of industrial production, in part, because of Armenia's antiquated capital stock. As we will discuss later, the modernization of Armenia's capital stock to date has been hindered by an underdeveloped financial system and generally poor domestic investment environment.
As seen in Figure 12 , despite a self-sufficient position in agricultural production and energy production, Armenian continues to experience large trade deficits. Since 1991, an independent Republic of Armenia has continued on its course of fundamental reforms towards a democratic society. This process of reforms resulting, in many cases, in the of creation of the new institutional systems needed for establishment of civil liberties, the transition to a market oriented economic system, the creation of a legal framework and the establishment of the rule of law, and the formation of democratic state governance remains ongoing. In accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of the government were separated. The institution of the RA President was introduced 6 , the institution of the Prime Minister was established, the creation of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenian was envisaged, and the election system was upgraded. In 1995, the RA Supreme Council was replaced with the RA National Assembly (Parliament). 
The Armenian Financial System
The particular importance of the banking system in the financial sector lies in its economy widespread connections, through which firms rely heavily in bank credit to 7 The Republic of Armenia President is not a subject of legislative initiative, however, without the signature of the President the law adopted by the Parliament cannot come into effect. At the same time, the Presidential veto has relative, postponing effect. 8 The priority is given to the adoption of the main financial law of the state.
finance their operations and investment. 9 The current unattractiveness of Armenia to foreign investors means that economic development, at least initially, must be financed from the domestic savings pool.
It is well-established that the level of financial development is strongly associated with growth in real per capita GDP growth, capital accumulation and economic efficiency. The banking system has shown relatively stable growth since 1998 (see Figure 3 ).
Banking system (capital) share in GDP also increased up to 2.9% in 2001 (2.6% in 2000).
In spite of this, the banking sector remains very small compared to the size of the overall economy. In 2001, the banking system assets ratio to GDP was 20%, the loan portfolio to GDP ratio was 9%, and the ratio of household deposits to GDP was 5%. Total loans 7 % 9 For example, see the data provided by Stiglitz J.E. "The role of the state in financial markets" (1994 Table 13 .
A contributing factor to the small size of the Armenian financial system relative to
Western countries is the near absence of retail banking market in Armenia. 12 New services are developing extremely slowly: a system of credit cards -ArCa was introduced just recently. Other financial institutions -insurance companies, pension funds and capital-market-related financial institutions have yet to emerge as meaningful players. Moreover, an efficient channel for direct finance is practically absent as
Armenian stock market development is in its infancy. 13 The population in general has little contact with the banking system either by means of depositing their savings or by means of borrowing. Margins of lending remain significant, suggesting high administrative costs and other inefficiencies.
There are a number of problems in the Armenian banking system that impede its growth and development. These include,
The small size of most banks: scoring models cost in excess of $150,000 and the total investment in systems required to implement a credit scoring system is around $1,000,000.
Weak credit culture:
Prior to Armenia's independence, bank lending involved making loans to state-run companies and the government as part of the centrally planned economy directed much of the lending. Even today government debt makes up a large share of banking assets in Armenia. Hence, credit evaluation and a strong credit culture was not part of the lending process prior to 1991. Development of strong monitoring and management practices in the area of lending is underway, but there is still a considerable work to be done.
Improvements in customer service are needed before the banks can engage in relationship-based lending. In addition, despite the rapid advances in credit scoring models and other credit evaluation and management tools worldwide, Armenian banks have been slow to adopt these as part of their credit evaluation process. Not only is the development of good underwriting standards for bank loans important to the strength of the banking sector, and by implication public confidence in banks, sound credit evaluation and policies are critical to efficient and effective financial intermediation.
After all, the contributions of the banking sector to economic growth hinge on how well it does in allocating Armenia's savings pool to investment projects.
Financial Regulatory Structure
The key laws governing the banking system are the Law on the Central Bank and the Law on Banks and Banking activities. Other laws relevant for the banking sector are Law on Bankruptcy of Banks and the Law on Secrecy.
The financial infrastructure in Armenia consists of two formal governmental bodies:
1) the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which is a part of Government structure and operating upon Government decisions and 2) the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia which management structure is described below.
The Besides conducting open market operations, the CBA also serves the lender of last resort to the banking system. General liquidity support to the financial system is provided by the CBA through a Lombard facility, any time in the operational day. The lending rate of interest (Lombard loan rate) is determined by Board of the CBA for the given twoweek period.
A Proposal for an Armenian Deposit Insurance System
Deposit insurance should be implemented as part of a broader program of economic and financial system reforms. It is well known that an unintended consequence of federal deposit guarantees is moral hazard, which can lead to socially sub-optimal risk taking by insured institutions and reduced system stability. Hence, the implementation of deposit insurance would properly be done as the last part of a financial reform package, and as a complement to reforms that improve the efficiency and stability of the banking system. It is critically important that the deposit insurance system (DIS) be designed to fit the legal and social traditions of Armenia and be consistent with the social welfare goals used to justify the DIS's existence.
Social Welfare Goals for Deposit Insurance
Adopting an explicit deposit insurance scheme will help promote the stability of the Armenian banking system in two ways. First, it will provide Armenian policymakers the opportunity to credibly withdraw implicit government guarantees of bank liabilities and will place a buffer between the losses in failed banks and the public treasury. It easier, in principle, to contain the subsidies associated with explicit deposit guarantee schemes than implicit ones, and by implication less difficult to mitigate the perverse incentives of a system of explicit guarantees than implicit ones. Second, a properly designed and implemented system of explicit deposit insurance should improve depositor confidence in the small banks in Armenia, allowing them to grow and compete effectively with the larger banks in the banking system. Increased competition among banks will force banks to improve their risk management systems and processes and hence, enhance asset quality and the strength of earnings. Moreover, by reducing the concentration in the Armenian banking system the adoption of explicit deposit insurance is one step towards curbing the view that the three largest Armenian banks are too-big-to-let fail, thus improving market discipline and long-run system stability.
The primary social welfare goals for an Armenian deposit insurance system are the protection of small savers, capital accumulation, and increased financial intermediation.
These goals are mutually reinforcing, as the crucial point of adopting DIS is that small savers have confidence that bank deposits are safe savings vehicles and hence, they will place their savings into the banking system. This in turn, will increase the proportion of the savings pool available to fund business investment and hence, promotes economic growth and development. The current inability of Armenia to attract meaningful amounts of direct foreign investment makes improving the intermediation of domestic savings even more imperative.
Deposit insurance systems around the world vary in the amount of coverage they 
Coverage
It is well-established that empirical research supports the hypotheses that narrow coverage enhances market discipline and reduces moral hazard 16 . The narrow coverage specifically means excluding certain types of deposits. For example, it is common to exclude interbank deposits from deposit insurance coverage. One reason for this is that banks through the interbank market serve as an important source of market discipline that complements official regulation. It is also undesirable to extend insurance coverage to foreign-currency deposits in Armenia. 17 Guaranteeing deposits denominated in foreign currencies would complicate the resolution of officially failed banks by requiring the DIS to convert its assets into foreign currencies -and likely at a time when foreign exchange is at a premium. Alternatively, it would require the DIS to hold its insurance reserve in foreign denominated assets, thereby reducing investment in Armenian assets and offsetting some of the social benefits of deposit insurance. Finally, excluding foreigncurrency denominated deposits from deposit insurance coverage would put pressure on government authorities to operate the deposit insurance system more efficiently.
One of the key points, that needs to be discussed during DIS adoption is the determination of the limits of coverage on those types of deposits eligible for government guarantees. The purpose of such limitations is two-fold. First, most of the social benefits from deposit insurance are captured with low levels of deposit insurance coverage, and a decreasing marginal benefit as coverage levels are increased. Second, the marginal social cost of government-provided deposit insurance is an increasing function coverage levels.
The increasing social costs of official deposit insurance derive from its impact on the risk taking incentives and efficiency of commercial banks' management. This is something that was well understood by economists and policymakers at the time the United States adopted federal deposit insurance as part of the Glass-Steagall reforms of 1933.
18
Clearly, the net social benefits of official deposit guarantees are the highest under a system of partial coverage, and with fairly low coverage limits.
As we can see from cross-country analysis [see for instance Demirgüç-Kunt ( development of the country.
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To derive the optimal ceiling on deposit insurance coverage requires a detailed costbenefit analysis that is well beyond the scope of this paper. We propose an alternative method for arriving at the coverage limit that links deposit insurance coverage to one of the objectives for DIS, to promote the holding of savings in the form of bank deposits to promote economic development. From this objective we have tried to evaluate a reasonable boundary values of deposits to be insured. As such, we consider the average sum of savings needed for the establishment one additional working place in the economy. So this sum (average size of investment) grossed up by some reasonably small number to account for additional working capital needs should be the basis for setting the ceiling on deposit insurance coverage.
One feature of Armenian deposit insurance that merits consideration is the adoption of a graduated system of guarantees, or coinsurance for deposit balances in excess of the fully insured limit. Essentially, the graduated system would guarantee 100 percent of deposits up to the limit established using our 'average sum of investment required to establish a small business' limit, and some declining percentage of deposits above that limit. For example, the original plan for deposit insurance in the United States had the following graduated structure: First $10,000 100 percent $10,001 to $50,000 75 percent $50,001 and up 50 percent.
Premiums
It is, perhaps, not surprising that the price nations charge for official deposit insurance coverage varies widely across countries, with the percentage charged for coverage connected with the level of financial depth and development in the country. The crosscountry studies of deposit insurance find that the insurance premiums are range from 0.005% (Bangladesh) to 2% (Venezuela) of insured deposits.
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As we know from theoretical literature deposit insurance should price the estimated risk the bank passes through to the insurer. To estimate bank risk and set deposit insurance premiums, regulators typically use qualitative indicators collected from on-site and off-site bank examinations, together with accounting-based indicators, such as CAMEL-type indicators.
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At this point in time arriving at a system of fully risk-adjusted premiums for deposit insurance for Armenian banks is problematic at best. Such a system would require more sophisticated banking accounting systems and more granular regulatory data collection on than is currently feasible. In addition, it would require the adoption of mathematical and financial modeling that is currently beyond what official agencies are capable of producing at this time. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the explicit pricing of deposit insurance is of second-order importance relative to "loss control." For one, fair value of deposit insurance depends on the both the probability of default by a bank and the loss to the insurance fund given the default. Ronn and Verma () show how the fair value of deposit guarantees is conditioned upon the loss threshold at which the failure of a bank is officially recognized. In addition, Buser, Chen and Kane Hence, while truly risk-based premiums are a desirable feature of any official deposit insurance scheme, coverage and closure policies are more critical. Hence, we argue that initially a risk-related premium system should be established as an interim step towards fairly priced guarantees. As such, we recommend that the Republic of Armenia adopt a premium system similar to that adopted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the early 1990s where banks are divided into 9 premium classes based on regulatory/examination rating and overall capitalization. Premiums should be assessed initially according to total risk-adjusted bank assets with adjustments made for offbalance sheet exposures -until the fund is fully capitalized -and then only on insured deposits. We recommend that the initial premium schedule be set with the lowest premium in the range of 8 basis points and the highest no greater than 100 basis points.
Finally, the interim deposit insurance pricing scheme should have an explicit sunset date. We recommend that five years after the adoption of deposit insurance or two years after the adoption of the Basel II capital standards, which ever comes first, a full -risk adjusted pricing schedule be adopted. Moreover, the enabling legislation should require the commission of a study of risk-adjusted premiums to be undertaken within a year of enactment. Finally, the DIS of Armenia should explore reinsuring some of its exposure abroad, either through private reinsurance agencies or through multinational lenders such as the International Monetary Fund.
Fund
The level of the explicit deposit insurance reserve (henceforth, fund) is less important than the fund's call on taxes and special assessments on depository institutions should the fund become depleted. There are, therefore, three general decisions to make concerning we suggest the following mechanism be used. After determining the initial level of the fund the Republic of Armenia should issue bonds to capitalize the fund. The bonds would be paid-off over a ten-year period out of premium income. The DIS would have the authority to charge an additional 20 basis points per dollar of assets if needed to service this debt. Given the lack of development and depth of financial markets in Armenia it is unlikely that these bonds could be placed with private investors. Therefore, we suggest that banks be required to hold these bonds up to a limit of three percent of their assets.
Banks would be free to sell the bonds to other financial institutions and private investors (foreign and domestic). However, the Central Bank would be forbidden to invest in the DIS bonds and except for emergency borrowing DIS bonds would not be eligible collateral for CBA Lombard loans.
The ongoing or operating fund should have the resources to simultaneously handle the costs of resolving the two largest banks in Armenia. The DIS would not have access to borrowings from the CBA. However, the DIS would have two additional sources of 22 The surplus in the capital accounts of the Federal Reserve Banks was used to initially capitalize the FDIC's insurance reserve. While the Reserve Banks were given securities in exchange for the surplus, they proceeded to charge-off of these claims against their earnings until the securities were completely written off. In effect, the FDIC's fund was capitalized using seigniorage revenues (taxes). See Todd (1988) . Finally, should the DIS insurance reserve fall below the statutory minimum, as defined above, the DIS will have the authority to assess a special premium of up to 20 basis points against the assets of insured depository institutions. It is recommended that when the fund reaches a level that is in excess of 150 percent of the statutory minimum that 50 percent of premiums be rebated to the banks (so long as there are no outstanding capitalization bonds or outstanding balances on the emergency lines of credit).
Membership
Ideally, membership in a system of deposit insurance would be voluntary, with appropriate entrance and exit fees to prevent free riding. Entry and exit by banks would serve as signal to regulators as to the underlying condition of the fund and reduces the incentives for regulatory forbearance. However, it is not clear that a voluntary fund could be operated in an emerging market nation, particularly one with an underdeveloped financial system. Hence, we recommend that as a condition of charter banks be required to belong to the DIS for a minimum of ten years.
Regulatory Infrastructure
As one goal of DIS is to protect small savers there is no justification for providing de jure or de facto guarantees of large deposits. Large depositors and other financial market participants must have the incentive to provide market discipline to the banking system.
Moreover, the structure and operation of the DIS must be consistent with needs of uninsured claimants to protect themselves from loss without triggering large scale runs on the banks or implicit protection from the DIS. This means adopting a governance structure for the DIS that is independent from political influence, but has input from market participants and other regulatory bodies.
We suppose that this structure's members can represent and divided by the following logic. The structure (board of governors) members (7) can be divided by the following scheme: the president of the Union of Banks of Armenia, two additional members elected by the banks in the DIS, the Chairman of CBA, the Minister of Finance and Economy, and two political appointees, one of whom will serve as DIS Chairman. Of the political appointees, only one can be a member of the majority coalition in the Parliament. The
Chairman of the CBA and the Minister of Finance and the Economy will serve as nonvoting members on the DIS board of governors.
Conclusion
Increasingly developing nations, spurred on in part by international lending agencies, are looking at deposit insurance as the magic bullet of financial system reform.
Stabilization and development of the financial system, which in most transition economies is the banking system, is considered a critical part of economic development.
The link between the depth of financial system development and economic growth is well documented in recent empirical work.
The 1980s experience of the United States with federal deposit insurance provides a stark reminder that government guarantees of deposits is not a panacea. Moreover, recent studies of deposit insurance in developing nations illustrates how poorly designed system of government deposit guarantees can be destabilizing. Hence, the addition of explicit deposit guarantees to a country's official financial safety net should be done only after careful consideration, specifically taking into account country circumstances in its design.
We provide an overview of the design for a system of official deposit guarantees for the Republic of Armenia. This proposed design takes into consideration the overall structure of the Armenian economy, its official institutions and the financial system.
Furthermore, we outline specific design features for the Armenian deposit insurance system that are consistent with the social welfare objectives that underpin arguments for its adoption, while minimizing the distortions of these government guarantees on incentives. Key among the design features are limited coverage of deposits, separation of deposit insurance from central banking, and extended liability of banks for losses incurred by the deposit insurance fund. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Table 3 . Volume of industrial production by production sectors (millions AMD) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III 
